The global energy transition has entered a new phase. What began as a climate and technology story is now unmistakably geopolitical. Critical minerals, copper, cobalt, lithium, nickel, manganese and rare earth elements have moved from commodity markets into national security strategy. Governments are no longer merely supporting renewable deployment; they are competing to secure the raw materials that make it possible.
The International Energy Agency’s Global Critical Minerals Outlook makes clear that demand for key transition minerals could double or even triple by 2040 under net-zero pathways. Electric vehicles, grid expansion, battery storage and clean power infrastructure are structurally mineral-intensive. As a result, supply chain concentration has become a strategic vulnerability.
China currently dominates processing and refining capacity across several critical minerals, even where extraction occurs elsewhere. The United States and European Union have responded with industrial policy instruments such as the Inflation Reduction Act and the EU Critical Raw Materials Act, both designed to diversify sourcing and reduce dependence on single-country supply chains.
Africa sits at the centre of this contest. The Democratic Republic of Congo supplies over 70% of global cobalt, Zambia is among the world’s largest copper producers, while Zimbabwe and Namibia are emerging lithium exporters, and South Africa remains a dominant source of platinum group metals. The mineral transition has become a strategic contest, and Africa is no longer just a supplier.
U.S.–China rivalry is reshaping investment flows
The most visible dynamic shaping Africa’s mineral landscape is the intensifying rivalry between the United States and China. China has spent two decades building vertically integrated mineral supply chains. Chinese companies control significant stakes in cobalt and copper assets in the DRC, and Chinese refiners process a substantial share of global lithium and rare earth output. Infrastructure financing, through mechanisms such as the Belt and Road Initiative, has reinforced this presence.
In response, Washington has accelerated diplomatic and financial engagement in Africa’s mineral sector. U.S. initiatives include offtake agreements, development finance support through the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, and backing for strategic infrastructure such as the Lobito Corridor linking Angola, Zambia and the DRC to Atlantic ports. Recent reports indicate an expanded U.S. effort to counter Chinese control in African minerals.
Similarly, the European Union is pursuing diversification strategies under its Global Gateway initiative and Critical Raw Material Act. This rivalry is altering investment flows into the continent. Beyond geological viability, projects are now being evaluated on their geopolitical alignment as well. Financing packages increasingly include strategic considerations like transparency standards, ESG frameworks, and supply chain security clauses.
For African governments, this competition expands options. But it also increases pressure, as negotiating between competing powers requires institutional strength, policy clarity and diplomatic dexterity.
Governance debates are becoming as important as geology
As geopolitical interest intensifies, governance questions have moved to the forefront. The global debate is no longer simply about access to minerals; it is also about how those minerals are extracted, processed and governed. Concerns over environmental degradation, community displacement, corruption and transparency have prompted greater scrutiny from civil society, investors and importing governments alike.
The OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Mineral Supply Chains has become a reference point for responsible sourcing. The U.S. and EU increasingly link mineral supply agreements to governance and ESG benchmarks, while multilateral lenders stress regulatory reform and contract transparency as preconditions for support.
For African states, this creates both leverage and complexity. On one hand, governance standards can strengthen bargaining positions and ensure better value capture, and on the other, compliance requirements can slow project timelines and raise costs in already capacity-constrained environments.
Domestic politics add another layer. In the DRC, public debate around mineral contracts reflects concerns about sovereignty and long-term benefit distribution. Similar tensions surface in Namibia’s lithium policy debates and Ghana’s approach to critical mineral licensing.
Geopolitical competition has therefore transformed minerals into governance battlegrounds. The central question is now who mines, under what rules and for whose benefit.
Value addition is the new frontier of competition
Africa’s policy discourse increasingly emphasises beneficiation and local value addition. Leaders argue that exporting raw minerals while importing finished batteries and electric vehicles perpetuates dependency. The African Union’s African Mining Vision has long called for greater integration of mining into industrial policy. The African Development Bank similarly stresses mineral-based industrialisation as a pathway to structural transformation.
However, value addition requires more than political will. It demands reliable electricity, skilled labour, logistics corridors, regulatory certainty and competitive pricing frameworks. In many African jurisdictions, these conditions remain uneven.
Geopolitical competition could accelerate value addition if structured well. Western partners increasingly signal interest in supporting downstream processing to diversify refining away from China. Yet refining capacity is capital-intensive and energy-hungry, and without robust grids and cost-reflective power markets, beneficiation strategies risk remaining aspirational.
The real competition, therefore, isn't just for mineral rights, but for supply chain positioning. Will Africa remain primarily an extractor, or can it secure a meaningful foothold in processing and manufacturing? The answer depends less on foreign rivalry and more on domestic institutional coherence.
Infrastructure corridors are emerging as strategic assets
Mineral geopolitics has now extended beyond mines to rail lines, ports and power infrastructure. The Lobito Corridor, backed by U.S. and European financing, is emblematic of this shift. By linking the copper belts of the DRC and Zambia to Angola’s Atlantic coast, it aims to provide an alternative export route to Chinese-controlled logistics networks. Infrastructure has become a strategy.
Similarly, port expansions in Namibia and Mozambique, and rail rehabilitation projects across Southern Africa, are increasingly framed as critical mineral enablers rather than generic transport upgrades. This corridor logic reshapes development planning. Infrastructure is no longer neutral, as it has been embedded within global supply chain politics.
For African policymakers, corridor planning offers leverage. But it also requires coordination across ministries, countries and regulatory regimes. Weak governance or fragmented planning can undermine otherwise strategic assets. In the mineral transition, roads and rails are as consequential as ore bodies.
The risk of a new resource dependency
History casts a long shadow over Africa’s mineral politics. The risk is not only that geopolitical rivalry intensifies extraction, but that it entrenches a new form of dependency. If Africa exports raw lithium to be refined abroad and re-imports finished batteries, the structural imbalance persists. If copper leaves in concentrate form and returns as high-value components, value capture remains limited.
The World Bank has warned that countries rich in critical minerals face heightened macroeconomic volatility and governance risk if institutions don't evolve alongside resource rents. Geopolitical competition can exacerbate this risk if speed overtakes scrutiny. Deals negotiated under strategic urgency may sacrifice long-term domestic development priorities.
There is a dual challenge: avoid marginalisation in global supply chains while avoiding repetition of past extractive cycles. Execution will determine which path prevails.
Africa’s agency will shape the outcome
It is tempting to frame Africa as a passive theatre of U.S.–China rivalry. That narrative is outdated.
African governments are increasingly assertive in negotiating terms, revising mining codes, and leveraging multilateral partnerships. The multipolar landscape creates bargaining space. Countries can diversify partners, compare financing offers, and demand infrastructure commitments alongside extraction rights.
However, agency depends on institutional capacity, transparency, and policy coherence. Having strong contract negotiation teams, independent regulatory bodies, and credible dispute resolution mechanisms are decisive advantages.
In a world where mineral supply chains underpin the clean energy economy, Africa’s role is pivotal. But strategic relevance doesn't automatically translate into economic transformation. Geopolitical competition is intensifying. Investment flows are shifting, and governance debates are sharpening. The decisive variable is whether African institutions can convert global demand into durable development.
Conclusion: the execution decade has begun
The mineral race is no longer abstract. It is unfolding in contracts, corridors and cabinet rooms. For Africa, the stakes are higher than supply security for foreign powers. They are about industrialisation, fiscal stability and long-term competitiveness in an electrified global economy.
The intensifying U.S.–China dynamic will continue to shape investment flows and governance debates. But the outcome won't be decided in Washington or Beijing, but in Lusaka, Kinshasa, Windhoek, Accra and Pretoria.
If others focus on rivalry, Energy Transition Africa will continue to focus on delivery, on the rules, institutions and infrastructure that decide who truly benefits from the mineral transition. The mineral contest has begun. The question is, is Africa prepared?
